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Pakistan has had a chequered democratic history but elections in 2013 marked a 
second turnover in power, and the first transition in Pakistan’s history from one freely 
elected government to another.  How do we best categorize (and therefore understand) 
political developments in Pakistan?  Is it now safe to categorize it as an electoral 
democracy or is it still a hybrid case of democracy? Using the Pakistani case as an 
example, this article argues that hybrid regimes deserve consideration as a separate 
case (rather than as a diminished sub type of democracy or authoritarianism), but 
must be categorised along a multidimensional continuum to understand the dynamics 
of power within the political system. 
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civil liberties, reserved domains 
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How to understand Pakistan’s hybrid regime: the importance of a 
multidimensional continuum. 
 
Introduction 
 
Not all countries that have undergone a transition to democracy are necessarily on the 
path to becoming consolidated democracies.  As such, definitions of ‘hybrid regimes’ 
have proliferated. Any database search reveals an enormous number of articles 
discussing hybrid regimes in individual countries or in particular regions.  Few of 
those articles discussing particular cases seek to expand our understanding of the 
concept of hybrid regime.  These particulars are important for providing information 
to construct comparative theories, but this article seeks to do more.  The analysis in 
this article demonstrates the limitations of one-dimensional classifications of regimes, 
using the case of Pakistan. Pakistan is an important case in the hybrid regime 
literature, although until 2008 (when many of the hybrid regime datasets end) it was 
classified as an authoritarian state.
i
  Since 2008 there are important features of the 
current Pakistani political system that distinguish it from the 1988-1999 period, 
despite both periods being classified as ‘party free’ by Freedom House.ii One of these 
is the increased commitment of its civilian politicians to the democratic process. Yet, 
the armed forces remain powerful, meaning Pakistan remains in a ‘gray zone’ – where 
there are ‘some attributes of democratic political life …[but also] serious democratic 
deficits’. iii  However, although an obvious descriptor of Pakistan might be of a 
‘tutelary democracy’, iv focusing only on reserved domains of power is ultimately 
unhelpful. Accounting for different elements in a political system is important to 
understand the realities (and limitations) of power, and the ‘degree of institutional 
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variation in political regimes.’ v As Merkel has argued, it is important to have a 
multidimensional approach to understand if elections are meaningful.
vi
  
 
Comparative analysis of hybrid regimes 
 
The literature on hybrid regimes can broadly be divided into three camps, although 
there are overlaps between them.  The first school, including authors such as 
O’Donnell and Zakaria saw hybrid regimes as flawed or ‘defective’ democracies;vii 
posing different ways in which they lacked the full attributes of democracy.
viii
 These 
included ‘Exclusive-’, ‘Delegative-’, ‘Illiberal-’, ‘Tutelary-’, ‘Pseudo-’ and Electoral-
Democracy.
ix
 These seek to distinguish regimes by their deviation from one element 
of democracy e.g. civil liberties (illiberal democracy); the existence of reserved 
domains (tutelary democracy) or the lack of horizontal accountability (delegative 
democracy).  The second school, including authors such as Schedler and Cassani have 
argued that hybrid regimes are effectively authoritarian states, and, in contrast to 
those scholars viewing hybrid regimes as defective democracies, stress ‘the attributes 
these [authoritarian] regimes possess, rather than what they lack’. x  Scholars 
proceeding from this assumption have proposed sub-categories of authoritarian 
regime e.g. electoral authoritarianism and semi-authoritarianism to understand 
differences between authoritarian regimes.
xi
 Distinct from these, a third school, 
including Bogaards, Gilbert and Mohseni and Wigell defend the hybrid regime 
category as being a separate regime type, overlapping with both authoritarian and 
democratic categories. Bogaards’ illuminating discussion of the different ways 
authors have classified hybrid regimes proposed mapping ‘contemporary regimes 
from both sides of the [democratic and authoritarian] spectrum’.xii  
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However, all classifications relying on only one element, such as civil liberties in the 
case of Zakaria’s categorising of illiberal democracy, or the extent of reserved powers 
of the military in the case of tutelary democracy, will limit our understanding. For 
example, focusing on the institutionalised prerogatives of the military may not 
account for informal prerogatives (and therefore underestimate the effective power of 
military) or ignores other elements that have changed within the political system e.g. 
political unity against the military. Therefore, we cannot rely on unidimensional 
concepts such as tutelary democracy. Some existing analyses of hybrid regimes have 
already advocated a two dimensional approach (e.g. Bogaards and Wiggell) or a 
multidimensional approach (e.g. Gilbert and Mohseni).
xiii
  
 
Why it is important that Pakistan is classified as a hybrid regime? 
 
Since 2008, Pakistan can no longer be categorised as an authoritarian regime where a 
powerful military uses elections to legitimize itself. Opposition parties in Pakistan 
have not only won power, but there has been a transfer of power between the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). 
Additionally, the electorate has voted a democratically elected government out of 
office, the first time in Pakistan’s history this has occurred.xiv As importantly, these 
elections were categorized as relatively free and fair by independent international and 
national election observers.
xv
 Contestation for political office is real.  But are these 
elections free and fair enough to categorize Pakistan as an electoral democracy as 
Freedom House did in 2014?
xvi
 To determine whether electoral procedures have 
substance, Schedler has proposed seven conditions: empowerment (citizens wield 
power to choose decision makers and there is no limited ‘scope of jurisdiction of 
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elective offices’), free supply (‘the free formation of alternatives’ to choose from), 
free demand (‘free formation’ of preferences, including ‘access to plural sources of 
information’), inclusion (universal suffrage), insulation (free expression of 
preferences without coercion), integrity (‘neutral election management’) and 
irreversibility (the ‘winners must be able to assume office, exercise power and 
conclude their terms’).xvii  
 
If we apply these criteria to Pakistan, as Table 1 demonstrates, it would be extremely 
problematic to categorize Pakistan as an electoral democracy before 2008.
xviii
   
Between 1988 (when Benazir Bhutto became the first female premier of a Muslim 
country) and 1999 (when General Pervez Musharraf toppled Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif from power), four general elections were held in Pakistan. Power alternated 
between the PPP and the PML-N, but all four governments were dismissed: either by 
the president colluding with the military - 1990, 1993 and 1996 - or directly by the 
military -1999.
xix
 While the electorate voted in four governments during this period, 
they were unable to vote any governments out.  
 
Many more of the criteria have been met or partially met after 2008, and even more so 
after 2013. There are constraints on politicians; most notably in terms of the ‘red 
lines’ politicians cannot cross, as well as restrictions on journalistic freedom and the 
freedom to express preferences.  By Schedler’s criteria,  
 
[p]artial compliance with democratic norms does not add up to partial 
democracy. Gross violation of any one condition invalidates the fulfillment of 
all the others. If the chain of democratic choice is broken anywhere, elections 
become not less democratic but undemocratic.
xx
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Table 1: Schedler’s ‘chain’ of electoral democracy applied to Pakistan  
 
However, we contend that competition between parties is real, with alternation in 
power and a relatively level playing field. There are important differences to the 
1988-1999 period that cannot be understood using Schedler’s criteria. Schedler’s 
electoral authoritarianism or electoral democracy alternatives do not ‘fill the 
conceptual space’ between … liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism’.xxi This 
reveals the limitations of his dichotomous approach.  
 
One obvious alternative descriptor of Pakistan would be that of ‘tutelary democracy’: 
‘a regime which has competitive, formally democratic institutions, but in which the 
power apparatus, typically reduced by this time to the armed forces, retains the 
capacity to intervene to correct undesirable states of affairs’. xxii  This is less 
democratic than an electoral democracy. This term has been used to describe Pakistan 
before, e.g. LaPorte, Waseem and Levitsky and Way.
xxiii
 But the same term has been 
applied to very different periods of Pakistan’s history.  This confirms our suspicion 
that it cannot capture the differences between the 1988-1999 and the post-2008 
Conditions for 
electoral democracy 
Status 1988-99 Status 2008-13 Status after 
2013 
Empowerment Partially met Partially met Partially met 
Free supply Met Met Met 
Free demand Not met Partially met Partially met 
Inclusion Partially met Partially met Met 
Insulation Partially met Partially met Partially met 
Integrity Partially met Partially met Met 
Irreversibility Partially met Partially met Partially met 
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period. Some ‘tutelary regimes’ are more democratic than others. Rhoda Rabkin has 
argued that the concept is too elastic and that we need to rigorously improve it.
xxiv
 
Part of this improvement must come from the inclusion of tutelary powers within a 
wider multidimensional understanding of regimes.  
 
The rest of this article uses the example of Pakistan to demonstrate the importance of 
a multidimensional continuum for analysing hybrid regimes.  This builds on the work 
of Merkel and Gilbert and Mohseni and engages with the work on regime 
heterogeneity.
xxv
  
 
Alternative descriptors of Pakistan  
 
The literature on democratization is replete with authors advocating the importance of 
multidimensional understandings of regimes.  One of the most useful for the purposes 
of this article is that of Wolfgang Merkel, who proposes understanding defective 
democracies along three measures; vertical legitimacy; horizontal accountability and 
effective government.  Although his measure is not applied specifically to hybrid 
regimes, it draws our attention to the importance of separately accounting for reserved 
domains of power.
xxvi
  
 
Merkel’s analysis has been applied explicitly to hybrid regimes by Gilbert and 
Mohseni
xxvii
 Their dimensions are described as ‘competitiveness’, ‘civil liberties’ and 
‘tutelary interference’.xxviii  Their multidimensional approach enables us to distinguish 
between tutelary regimes that are competitive compared to those that are not, an 
important distinction in relation to Pakistan and other systems transitioning from 
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military rule. A multidimensional approach also allows us to assess whether formal 
procedural political rights are matched by civil liberties, a point made by Denk and 
Silander in their discussion of the importance of understanding regime 
heterogeneity.
xxix
   
 
However, Gilbert and Mohseni insist on a dichotomous categorisation of their three 
criteria.  This has the advantage of parsimony, but it conceals important differences 
between regimes e.g. Chile’s military maintained much higher levels of formal 
prerogatives in the 1990s than did Pakistan’s in 2008.xxx A dichotomous measurement 
of the three dimensions does not provide sufficiently rigorous criteria by which 
regimes can be compared. In practice it may have limited comparative applicability, 
and therefore reinforces the importance of adopting continuous rather than 
dichotomous measures.  
 
This article aims at classifying Pakistan along the three dimensions of 
Competitiveness, Civil Liberties and Reserved Domains.  An extensive literature has 
focused on measuring democracy along multidimensional lines and this has rightly 
questioned the components that are included in the different dimensions
xxxi
, the nature 
of scaling and aggregation
xxxii
, whether the measures are independent of each 
other
xxxiii
 or the dangers of combining items that bear no empirical relation to each 
other.
xxxiv
 In addition of course, as Bollen reminds us, many of these indicators are 
subject to subjective, albeit often expert, interpretation
xxxv
 unless empirical measures 
such as the percentage of turnout or the percentage of seats/votes secured by the 
winning party are used.  But many of these latter measures do not capture what we 
need to understand a political system.  
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We identify various elements to measure Pakistan on the three dimensions but accept 
that these are open for debate. We expect readers to differ on our inclusion (or 
omission) of specific elements, but given the vast literature debating the appropriate 
measures of democracy, it is unavoidable.  What is important is that the measures are 
transparent.    
 
We score each of the elements as Low, Medium and High and give these descriptions 
a numerical value, 0 for Low, 1 for Medium and 2 for High.
xxxvi
  We allow for cases 
that straddle these categories e.g. Low/Medium scores 0.5 and Medium/High scores 
1.5.  We then aggregate the elements in each dimension and divide by the number of 
elements to calculate the average score. We assume that all elements are equal. This 
produces a numerical value for each dimension. Importantly, we do not advocate 
summing these three scores and dividing them to achieve a ‘score’ for a hybrid 
regime.  To understand the nature of hybrid regimes, the whole is not more than the 
sum of its parts.  Unlike Merkel who creates distinct types of ‘defective democracies’, 
the concept of regime hybridity means that regimes can combine multiple 
characteristics.  Some states, such as Pakistan, do not neatly fit into categories.  It has 
characteristics of both a Merkel’s ‘illiberal democracy’ AND his ‘domain 
democracy’.xxxvii This is something that a multidimensional continuum can better take 
account of. 
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Competitiveness  
 
As has been extensively analysed, the existence of elections by themselves tell us 
little about a regime’s democratic status.xxxviii  The competitiveness of elections is 
important. We use Merkel’s four fold criteria to measure competiveness; a) Elected 
officials, b) Universal suffrage c) Right to candidacy d) Correctly organised free and 
fair elections.
xxxix
  
 
Elected officials:  
Both the 2008 and 2013 elections confirmed that citizens wield the power to choose 
decision-makers.  In 2013 the incumbents were swept aside at the national level as 
well as in provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Nawaz Sharif, the leader of 
the PML-N, was voted back into power for his third stint as Prime Minister, and 
confounded most commentators by winning a near majority of seats.
xl
   Imran Khan’s 
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) performed credibly but was unable to deprive the 
PML-N of victory.  This is important.  Before the 2013 election there was 
‘apprehension [on the part of the military] that Nawaz Sharif’s government [would] 
be a death knell for the military’s influence’.xli  While few commentators doubt the 
role of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in promoting Khan’s PTI, 
ultimately the military’s preferred outcome - a divided parliament, in which it could 
effectively hold the balance of power - failed to materialize.  Pakistan therefore must 
be scored as High on this component. However, as we will discuss in relation to 
reserved domains, the de-facto power of these elected officials is circumscribed. 
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Universal suffrage 
Pakistan has universal suffrage and can therefore be said to have inclusion.
xlii
 The 
accuracy of electoral rolls were hotly disputed in 2008 but by 2013 improvements had 
been made, at least partially because many women had obtained a national identity 
card to be eligible for the Benazir Income Support Programme.
xliii
 There were areas of 
Pakistan, particularly in KPK and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
where women were prevented from voting. Although the seriousness of this should 
not be underplayed, these were in a minority of electoral districts and did not prevent 
observers from describing the elections free and fair. This component should be 
scored as High/Medium because of some restrictions.  
 
Right to candidacy 
Although Merkel does not explicitly define this element, we define it as linked to the 
elements of political pluralism and participation: the freedom to form and to join 
organizations.
xliv
  The security services have historically
xlv
 played an active role in the 
formation of alternative political parties and encouraging defections from existing 
parties but they have not been able to prevent parties from organising, in notable 
contrast to Turkey (until 2001).  Political parties, while weakly institutionalized in the 
main, are important, and some have strong bases of support.
xlvi
  The Pakistan 
Taliban’s (TTP) 2013 announcement that they would target ‘secular’ political parties, 
including the PPP, meant that these parties had to severely restrict their campaigning.  
The Chairman of the PPP, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari was confined to making speeches 
via video-link. Although social media was important in this election, this was 
predominantly in urban areas. Thus, parties that were unable to campaign effectively 
were disadvantaged. However, this violence was not state sponsored as the parties 
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targeted were members of the governing coalition.  The TTP could not be said to be 
pursuing the military’s agenda given that one of the parties benefitting from the 
restrictions on the campaign (the PML-N) was not the military’s preferred candidate, 
and neither the PML-N nor the PTI were in government at the time.
xlvii
 As Diamond 
has argued, violence and intimidation by themselves do not preclude a state being 
classified as an electoral democracy unless the ‘political violence is clearly and 
extensively organized by the state or ruling party’. xlviii   This component should 
therefore be scored as High/Medium. 
 
Correctly organised, free and fair elections 
The 18
th
 Amendment to the constitution in 2010 improved the impartiality of the 
Election Commission. This strengthened the integrity of the 2013 elections compared 
to those in 2008, as did the provision to introduce caretaker governments. Although 
the level of turnout by itself cannot be a measure of participation (for example if the 
election is not free and fair) when other democratic freedoms are met, it can be an 
indication of an effective electoral regime.
xlix
 Turnout in 2013 was 55 per cent; much 
higher than previous elections, despite violent attempts to disrupt the elections by the 
TTP. This does not mean that 2013 was fraud free. Several polling stations returned 
turnout in excess of 100 per cent
l
 and as noted, some women were prevented from 
voting. However, the overall picture was that the elections were relatively free and 
fair, re-polling was ordered in only six National Assembly seats. In addition, although 
we disagree with Gilbert and Mohseni’s contention that a turnover in power is 
necessary to categorise an election as competitive
li
, the alternation of power in both 
the 2008 and 2013 elections demonstrated that the electorate’s preferences do matter.  
This differs from competitive authoritarian states, where elections do not pose a 
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serious threat to the incumbents and institutions are a façade ‘in order to conceal (and 
reproduce) harsh realities of authoritarian governance’.lii   In some areas, notably the 
tribal regions, there was an expectation that voters would vote en masse for powerful 
leaders, ‘on whom rural voters are socio-economically dependent [using]… their 
control over land and people’s livelihoods to tell them how to cast their vote’. liii  
However, in other areas of Pakistan, such as the Punjab, voters are free to express 
their preferences without coercion, although patronage politics is alive and well (as 
Mohmand puts it ‘ideological, class- or party-based identification is trumped by the 
need to access essential goods and services’). liv  On the level of institutional 
procedures, the election should be scored as Medium despite some irregularities.  
 
On the dimension of competitiveness, Pakistan performs relatively well as Table 2 
demonstrates.  
 
Table 2: Competitiveness 
Elected Officials High 2 
Universal Suffrage High/Medium 1.5 
Right to Candidacy High/Medium 1.5 
Free and fair elections Medium 1 
Overall average score 1.5 
 
Civil Liberties   
Civil liberties are important elements of a political system going ‘beyond the right to 
vote’, and ‘ensuring that the right to vote is meaningful.lv We score Pakistan on three 
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criteria for this dimension, using Merkel’s category of ‘Political Rights’, which 
includes Press Freedom and Freedom of Association with the Rule of Law.  
 
Press Freedom 
Musharraf liberalized the satellite television market.
lvi
 During the 2008 election the 
governing party (the PML-Q) benefitted from increased access to the media,
lvii
 but 
this did not prevent opposition parties from ‘disseminating their campaign 
messages’lviii and ultimately winning the election.  Reporters Without Borders did not 
raise the same concerns over differential access in the 2013 election although they 
noted ‘the threats to freedom of information posed by the waves of violence sweeping 
Pakistan’. lix   However, serious issues remain. There are certain subjects (such as 
criticising the ISI) on which it is unsafe to write, and pressure is placed on editors to 
ensure their staff fall into line.
lx
 Several journalists were attacked in the spring of 
2014, including a vocal critic of the TTP, Raza Rumi, and later, the prominent Geo 
TV news anchor and critic of the ISI, Hamid Mir.
lxi
  Geo’s explicit naming of the ISI 
as the probable culprits resulted in the army demanding its closure.
lxii
 Nawaz Sharif 
visited Hamid Mir in hospital in a show of solidarity, but the station was shut down 
for 15-days in June 2014 and army induced pressure continues upon the owner.
lxiii
 
The debate can be read as a proxy for the wider civilian and military tussle for power, 
which is still being played out, but demonstrates that access to plural sources of 
information is imperfect. Pakistan currently stands in the bottom eighth (159/180) of 
the Press Freedom Index.
lxiv
 Maya Tudor correctly argues that ‘[a]ny future coup 
plotters will find that “seizing the media” will be harder than it once was’, lxv 
especially as broadcasting in languages other than Urdu or English has proliferated, 
and many of the TV stations broadcast from the Gulf rather than from inside Pakistan. 
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Taken together with the proliferation in social media (which successfully reported 
many election irregularities in real time during the 2013 election, notably in urban 
areas such as Karachi), it is much harder for the army and intelligence agencies to 
control the dissemination of content, but pressure on those responsible for producing 
the substance of the content remains a threat to press freedom.
lxvi
  As the military has 
taken a step back from formal control, Siddiqa argues that it has ‘systematically 
manufactur[ed] opinion that would benefit the military as an institution.
lxvii
  An 
alleged example of this was a Newsweek article on the new COAS, entitled ‘Raheel 
Sharif: Man of the Year’.lxviii This component must therefore be scored as Medium. 
 
Freedom of Association 
Although some parties were targeted by the TTP during the 2013 election, political 
parties are permitted to form and to operate.  However, violence, much of which is 
perpetuated by the TTP, restricts civil and political liberties in certain areas of 
Pakistan, with implications for freedom of association.  As the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) note ‘[t]error attacks remain … a major threat to … 
freedom of assembly, targeting prayer congregations and funerals.’ lxix  This has 
recently escalated, as seen in Balochistan, on both ethnic and sectarian grounds.
lxx
 In 
addition, although many NGOs critical of the government are permitted to operate,
lxxi
 
the INGO, Save the Children, was banned from the country in June 2015 (the ban was 
retracted under pressure from the US).
lxxii
  The fall out from the association of the 
polio vaccination programme with the assassination of bin Laden continues, and has 
led to the killings of almost 70 polio workers. Many other organizations, such as those 
‘devoted to female education and empowerment’ are also attacked by the TTP.lxxiii 
This component must therefore be scored at Low. 
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Rule of Law 
In relation to the rule of law, an essential requirement for ‘the state…to uphold its 
laws effectively and to act according to clearly defined prerogatives’ lxxiv there are 
clear issues in Pakistan. The judiciary has become more politically active in recent 
years – the standoff between the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Musharraf was 
the catalyst for the departure of Musharraf.  Chaudhry had drawn attention to the issue 
of the ‘disappeared’ in Balochistan, a reference to the thousands who have gone 
missing, often, it is assumed, at the hands of the security services.  However, although 
the willingness of the senior judiciary to speak up on their behalf was a welcome 
development, the disappearances still continue and in general,  
 
…the police, the military, and the intelligence services enjoy impunity for 
indiscriminate or excessive use of force. Extrajudicial killings, enforced 
disappearances, torture, and other abuses are common.
lxxv
  
 
In addition, the personal animosity between Zardari and Iftikhar Chaudhry clouded 
relations between the judiciary and the executive.
lxxvi
 Judicial activism continued after 
Nawaz Sharif was elected.  As the HRCP noted in their 2013 report, ‘[h]aving 
convicted a prime minister for contempt of court the previous year, the SC continued 
in 2013 to aggressively hand down contempt notices to politicians criticising it.’lxxvii 
The HRCP also noted that despite 20,000 cases pending in the Supreme Court (and 
many more in the lower courts), they were concerned about the use of suo moto (on 
its own initiative) powers by the court ‘as legal experts highlighted lack of guidelines 
governing how the court took up and prioritised such matters’. lxxviii  Although an 
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independent judiciary is an important element of a democratic political system, a 
politicised judiciary is not. 
 
In addition, the killing of 132 children in a school in Peshawar in December 2014 led 
to the passing of the 21
st
 Amendment. This amendment empowers military courts to 
try those accused of terrorism offences.  HRCP has expressed concerns that certain 
groups will become targets, undermining civil liberties, and it will undermine the 
‘independent and strong judicial system’.lxxix Despite increased judicial activism, the 
politicised nature of the activism and the passing of the 21
st
 Amendment means that 
this component of civil liberties needs to be scored as Low. 
 
Table 3: Civil Liberties 
 
Press Freedom Medium 1 
Freedom of Association Low 0 
Rule of Law Low 0 
Overall average score 0.3 
 
Reserved Domains  
 
The third dimension is the existence (or otherwise) of reserved domains. This element 
has often been included within the competitiveness dimension, with scholars arguing 
that this effectively restricts the electoral regime. As Hadenis and Teorell remind us, 
although the procedural traits of democracy may be present, we need to also question 
how ‘these institutions actually function’.lxxx However, there are many dimensions 
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to a ‘tutelary regime’ which require a separate analysis of the ways in which 
reserved domains operate.   
 
If we assess whether there is a limited ‘scope of jurisdiction of elective offices’,lxxxi 
Pakistan certainly shows limitations in this area.  No ‘formal fencing off’ of policy 
domains exists unlike in other former military regimes e.g. Chile after Pinochet, 
which constitutionally ‘guaranteed a number of reserved policy domains and reserved 
positions in the Senate to military appointees’.lxxxii However, there are so called ‘red 
lines’ which democratically elected politicians would be wise not to cross.  
 
Croissant et al have proposed a continuum to measure how these institutions function.  
They classify civilian control over five issue areas; elite recruitment, public policy, 
internal security, external defense and military organization
lxxxiii
 with the specific 
intention of ‘aggregating the results’ to assess the degree of civilian control.lxxxiv This 
has the merit of assessing both formal and informal powers. Thus, although civilian 
autonomy has increased, a nuanced understanding demonstrates that although Nawaz 
Sharif has asserted civilian control in several key areas, the military’s prerogatives 
remain high in others. 
 
External defence 
In relation to their criteria of External Defence; civilian control remains low, despite 
the fact that the 2008-13 ‘parliament … [took] important strides toward becoming 
more active in foreign and defense policy’. lxxxv   The PML-N 2013 manifesto 
committed ‘to maintain democratic oversight of all aspects of foreign, defense and 
national security policies’.lxxxvi Grare notes, the ‘civilian role in foreign policy is not 
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absent, but its scope [is] … carefully defined’.lxxxvii  Therefore Nawaz Sharif attended 
Indian prime minister Modi’s inauguration over the objections of the military. 
However, Sharif has been unable to expand trading relations with India because of 
military opposition
lxxxviii
 and relations with Afghanistan temporarily improved 
primarily because of negotiations initiated between the new Afghan president, Ghani 
and Raheel Sharif, the COAS, not Nawaz Sharif.  This element must be scored as low. 
 
Internal Security 
In relation to internal security, Sharif’s ability to promote negotiations with the TTP 
(even though they ultimately broke down) and the differences in approach to 
Balochistan challenged military control over internal security policy. Although the 
talks with the TTP were a failure, and the army launched the Zarb-e-Azb military 
operation in June 2014, the fact that these talks were held despite the concerns of the 
new army chief was indicative of the changing civilian-military nexus. However, 
intelligence agencies continue to operate with near impunity, and disappearances 
continue, especially in provinces such as Balochistan, as discussed in the civil 
liberties section.  This element must therefore be scored as Medium/Low. 
 
Military organization 
Legally, the civilian regime possesses control over military appointments and the 
supreme command of the armed forces is constitutionally vested in the president on 
the advice of the prime minister. In practice, the military fiercely guards control over 
military appointments and promotions, also dominating senior bureaucratic 
appointments in the Ministry of Defence. However, Nawaz Sharif appointed his 
preferred COAS, Raheel Sharif (no relation) as Chief of Army Staff in November 
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2013 over two more senior officers (including former COAS Kayani’s preferred 
successor of Rashad Mahmood). In addition, although Musharraf’s indictment in 
March 2014 for treason and his ‘judicial and public humiliation [was] an important 
first in Pakistan’,lxxxix laying down the important precedent that generals can be held 
accountable for their actions (even if Musharraf is unlikely to be convicted)
xc
 Siddiqa 
argues that, ‘an indictment [of Musharraf] is neither here nor there. The military 
remains powerful and capable of defending its key interests’.xci  In addition, civilian 
control is very limited in other areas of military organization such as force size or 
hardware procurement, although the National Assembly now debates a limited 
version of the military budget. This means that civilian control must be measured as 
medium in this area.  
 
Public Policy 
Although the majority of decisions are in civilian hands, civilian control cannot be 
scored as high, because when civilian preferences relate to India, the military retains a 
veto e.g. preventing Sharif from improving trade relations with India. However, the 
changes introduced as a result of the 18
th
 Amendment (and the associated National 
Finance Commission (NFC) award) in 2010 made radical changes to the structure of 
power. The recommendations of the all-party Special Parliamentary Committee on 
Constitutional Reforms (SPCCR) in April 2010, implemented as the 18
th
 Amendment, 
went far beyond its original remit, introducing important constitutional changes in the 
distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces.  It also removed the 
controversial power of the president to unilaterally dissolve parliament or dismiss the 
prime minister.
xcii
  This had been used in the past to remove governments under 
pressure from the military.  It vested the executive authority of the federation with the 
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prime minister rather than the president and required the president to act on and in 
accordance with the advice of the Cabinet [or the Prime Minister]’. This included 
‘advice’ on appointing the heads of the military services as well as the provincial 
governors.
xciii
   
 
Agreement was also reached on vertical and horizontal transfers of resources in the 
NFC in 2009. Both the NFC and the 18
th
 Amendment made radical and important 
changes to the structure of power in Pakistan.
xciv
   That political leaders were able to 
reach agreement on these extremely divisive issues that had plagued the politics of 
Pakistan for decades signalled an important change about the willingness and ability 
of politicians to cooperate.  Significantly, although many of the decisions were deeply 
antithetical to the army, the latter was unable to prevent this agreement from being 
made.  They appear to have assumed civilians would not be able to reach agreement 
on these thorny issues and made a belated (although unsuccessful) attempt to derail 
it.
xcv
  In addition, the 2008 government of Pakistan confounded many expectations 
and concluded its term, the significance of which should not be underestimated. 
Civilian control over public policy must then be scored at Medium, depending on 
whether ‘domestic’ public policy infringes on aspects of external security.  
 
Elite recruitment 
Where Croissant et al’s criteria markedly differ from Stepan’s previous work on 
military prerogatives after a transition
xcvi
 and add a crucial dimension for 
understanding Pakistan and other regimes transitioning from military rule, is their 
focus on elite recruitment; where the ‘[m]ilitary dominate rule setting, process and 
outcomes of elite selection’.xcvii  It is in this area that the civilian part of the equation 
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has particularly asserted itself in Pakistan since 2008.  In particular, the ability of the 
military to launch a coup has been reduced by civilian unity. Despite major 
differences between the PML-N and PPP concerning the reinstatement of Chief 
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, the two parties demonstrated their ability to work together 
on wider issues.  This radically differed from the 1988-99 situation when the military 
was able to play off the civilian elites against each other.
xcviii
  
 
The reluctance of the majority of the democratically elected politicians to side with 
the army for narrow political gain indicates that space is being given to the 
democratic process.
xcix
  Politicians are aware that using the army to remove their 
opponents from power will undermine democracy.  This is a vitally important 
difference from the 1980s and 1990s when alliances between the army and politicians 
tainted large sections of the opposition with ‘collaboration’, a situation not conducive 
to engendering trust, necessary for democratic consolidation.
c
  As Hussain Haqqani 
observed, during this period, ‘Bhutto and Sharif’s real failing was their inability to 
work together, which in turn allowed Pakistan’s security services to exploit their 
differences and discredit them both’. ci   The comparative literature on democratic 
consolidation has pointed to the difficulties in increasing the autonomy of the civilian 
regime if politicians are willing to use the army as a means to undermine their 
opponents.
cii
  The PML-N’s decision not to ‘go along with the military when the latter 
tried to evict Zardari from the presidency’ in 2012ciii increased the democratic ‘space’. 
The support given to Nawaz Sharif in August-September 2014 by opposition 
parliamentarians in the face of the military supported Tahir ul Qadri and Imran Khan 
‘siege’ of Islamabad reflects the importance placed on the democratic process over 
and above short-term party political calculations.
civ
 This element must be scored as 
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High civilian control.  This contrasts to previous decades
cv
 and sets Pakistan apart 
from states such as Thailand where the military manipulate elite divisions.  The 
longer that the military remain out of government, the more likely it is that they will 
lose their status as the ‘natural leaders’ of Pakistan.   
 
Table 4: Reserved domains 
 
External Defence Low 0 
Internal Security Medium/Low 0.5 
Military Organisation Medium 1 
Public Policy Medium 1 
Elite Recruitment High 2 
Overall average score 1 
 
Conclusion: 
 
This article has demonstrated that a one-dimensional dichotomous measure to 
categorise a regime is inadequate. Under a dichotomous measure such as Schedler’s, 
Pakistan would be classified as an electoral authoritarian state, but we contend that it 
is important that we classify Pakistan as a hybrid regime. To deny that democratic 
contestation has become more real, and civilian autonomy is wider than the 1988-1999 
period would be mistaken. There is real competition for political office, resulting in 
alternation in power between different coalitions of political parties.   
 
To establish this we have adopted a framework that takes into account different facets 
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of a regime and acknowledges the importance of understanding regime heterogeneity. 
This article has advanced our understanding of regime categorisation by rejecting 
Gilbert and Mohseni’s dichotomous categorisation of competiveness, civil liberties 
and tutelary powers through a more nuanced analysis adapted from Merkel. Through 
an examination of the three dimensions of Electoral Regime, Civil Liberties and 
Reserved Domains, it has been demonstrated that it is important to identify differences 
within these three dimensions. This is because it is important to acknowledge that 
regimes may have a middle ground that falls between ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ competition, 
the presence or absence of effective civil liberties or different extents of reserved 
powers. This could either be in the areas that are formally reserved for the military, 
such as seats in the legislature e.g. in Indonesia until 2004; countries where there is no 
real prospect of an alternation in power e.g. Mexico under the period of PRI rule under 
2000; or those in which military power has been constrained but there has been a 
reversal of other democratic gains, such as Turkey.
cvi
  
 
A continuum, especially a multidimensional one detracts somewhat from parsimony 
but as Bogaards has argues, ‘in the real world mixed forms are expected’.cvii  This type 
of assessment allows for the fact that there can be overlaps between regimes.
cviii
  This 
approach enables us to score Pakistan (and other regimes) on three different 
dimensions while retaining a degree of parsimony.
cix
  It also enables us, following 
Denk and Silander’s discussion of regime heterogeneity, to move away from a 
discussion simply focusing on ‘electoral processes (and consider)… political 
institutions in general’. Their approach uses the standard deviation of Freedom House 
scores to assess ‘the degree of institutional variation in political regime’. cx  Adapting 
their approach using the scores in this article, by summing the categorical values of the 
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component values and calculating the standard deviation, we can see that Pakistan has 
a high degree of heterogeneity, 73% when the standard deviation of all the 
components are measured. When the aggregated components are summed (so the 
Electoral Regime receives a score of 1.5, Civil Liberties 0.3 and Reserved Domains 1) 
the variation decreases, but is still 52%. 
 
Table 5: Pakistan’s hybrid regime 
Electoral 
Regime 
Civil 
Liberties 
Reserved 
Domains 
Standard 
Deviation 
Degree of 
heterogeneity
cxi
 
2 1.5 1.5 1 1 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 2 0.72 73% 
1.5 0.3 1 0.60 52% 
 
 
As Table 5 demonstrates, Pakistan’s hybrid regime can be classified as competitive, 
with increasing civilian control, but with a very low level of civil liberties.  This is a 
framework that facilitates comparison with other hybrid regimes and helps us 
understand where the challenges to further democratisation lie. A low score on one 
dimension, such as civil liberties, can also undermine the reality of an electoral 
regime, but it is important to have separate categories so we can understand where the 
challenge comes from.  As such, this article has revealed that the nature of the current 
transition in Pakistan, while not secure, may be more sustainable than previous 
transitions precisely because of the increased civilian unity, reducing the military’s 
ability to influence elite recruitment. However, the real challenge comes in relation to 
the civil liberties of citizens, under challenge not from the elected parts of the regime, 
but those that are unelected (such as the security services) and the TTP.  A focus 
solely on electoral processes would not reveal this challenge, why is why it is 
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important to acknowledge the existence of regime heterogeneity.
cxii
 
 
It is too soon to determine whether Pakistan will remain a hybrid regime.  The 
military formally returned in Bangladesh after sixteen years of democratic rule and it 
is possible that the same will happen in Pakistan. However, unlike Turkey where 
military power was maintained partially because there was ‘elite disagreement on the 
basic rules of the regime and unwillingness to defend democratic rules’cxiii the major 
politicians have learnt the lessons of the 1980s and 1990s. Whether civilian unity 
significantly challenges the existing balance of power is, however, contested. To 
assume that Pakistan is on a path to consolidation would be a misreading of the power 
structures within the country that are unlikely to change in the short to medium term.  
Pakistan is likely to remain as a hybrid regime for the foreseeable future. 
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